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Abstract
Focusing on emerging market currency arrangements, we build a model of an exchange rate peg
with escape clauses and output persistence. We first show how output persistence works as an
additional ￿fundamental￿ so that an exogenous increase in persistence can make the currency peg
more vulnerable to speculative attacks. We then endogenise output persistence as arising from
capital market frictions that are caused by weak corporate governance institutions. It turns out
that in emerging market economies, often characterised by credit constraints, a partial reform of
corporate governance institutions may enhance a financial accelerator mechanism, which increases
output persistence and deteriorates the credibility of the exchange rate peg. A conservative
policymaker partially counters this adverse effect, but only a complete reform of corporate
governance institutions fully eliminates persistence and reduces the risk of currency crisis on all
levels of policy preferences.
JEL Classification: E58, F33, D84, G18, G38.
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